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EXERCISING JUDICIAL POWER:
A RESPONSE TO THE WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT'S CRITICS
THE HONORABLE LYNN ADELMAN*
SHELLEY FITE**
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal conservatives in Wisconsin have strongly
criticized the performance of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. A former
member of the court, Diane Sykes, now a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, warned that the court had
undergone a "dramatic shift," "depart[ed] from ... familiar and long-
accepted" constraints on its power, and failed to exercise its power
judiciously.' She called on Wisconsin lawyers to "sit up and take
notice.",2 Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Michael B. Brennan
echoed Judge Sykes's criticisms, stating that the court's actions raised
concerns "about the proper exercise of judicial authority under the
state's constitution and laws."3 And Milwaukee lawyer Rick Esenberg
published a paper under the aegis of the Federalist Society, quoting
former congressman Dick Armey for the proposition that the court had
* Lynn Adelman is a United States District Judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
and a former Wisconsin legislator.
** Shelley Fite is Judge Adelman's law clerk, J.D., magna cum laude, University of
Wisconsin Law School, 2006.
1. Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723,
725-26 (2006).
2. Id. at 726.
3. Michael B. Brennan, Are Courts Becoming Too Activist?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Oct. 2, 2005, at 1J.
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turned the Badger State into a "Tort Hell Tundra."'
The critics did not flinch from using the dreaded "A" word to
describe the direction of the court-they agreed that the court had
become "activist." In support of their attack, the critics relied primarily
on five recent decisions: State v. Knapp,' State v. Dubose,6 In re Jerrell
C.J.,7 Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,8 and Thomas v.
Mallett.9 Judge Brennan stated that each of the five cases exhibited one
of four "objective indicators of judicial activism": (1) "[f]lexible
adherence to precedent"; (2) "[i]nsufficient deference to political
decision-makers"; (3) "[b]road holdings and opinions"; and (4) "[b]road
judicial remedies."1° Judge Sykes agreed that the decisions displayed
"extraordinary activism" and claimed that the justices rendering them
had behaved like legislators." Esenberg concurred. 2 In criticizing the
court's performance, the critics made clear that in their view the court
should play a narrow role in public life-it should not make policy,
attempt to ameliorate social problems, or establish new rules."
Judge Sykes expressed the hope that her criticism would spark a
debate 4 Unfortunately, that debate has not yet occurred; rather, the
discussion has remained decidedly one-sided. The absence of a debate
may be due to the fact that the decisions at issue have little in common
and are thus difficult to analyze together. Three of the decisions involve
criminal procedure and two are tort cases. Of the criminal procedure
cases, two present constitutional issues and one involves the supreme
court's power to supervise the state's judicial system. Of the tort cases,
one involves judicial review of the constitutionality of a statute and the
4. RICK ESENBERG, A COURT UNBOUND? THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 2 (2007) (Federalist Society White Paper), available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070329_WisconsinWhitePaper.pdf.
5. 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.
6. 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.
7. 2005 WI 105,283 Wis. 2d 145,699 N.W.2d 110.
8. 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.
9. 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.
10. Brennan, supra note 3.
11. Sykes, supra note 1, at 738.
12. See generally ESENBERG, supra note 4.
13. See, e.g., id. at 1 (stating that courts should "apply rules," "as opposed to making
them"); id. at 2 (stating that if judges decide "which set of policies are best," then they cease
to act as judges); Sykes, supra note 1, at 737 (stating that the court should not solve "policy
problems"); Brennan, supra note 3 (stating that judges should act as "non-partisan legal
technicians," that should "find specific answers to legal questions in the text, structure and
history of the law, or... not rule at all").
14. Sykes, supra note 1, at 726.
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other is a common law case. Each case presents a discrete issue with a
distinct legal history and raises a different set of policy considerations.
Responding to Judge Sykes's call for a debate is also difficult
because the critics operate at a high level of generality. Ultimately, their
arguments come down to an assertion that, in each decision, the court
simply did too much, went too far. The generality of the critiques,
combined with the decisions' lack of similarity, blurs what exactly the
critics found objectionable about each decision. Of course, on one hand,
this makes it fairly easy for would-be responders to charge that the
critics simply objected to the decisions' results and the policies that the
court endorsed. And certain of their comments reinforce this
impression. For example, Judge Sykes objected to Thomas, a tort case,
partly because it may adversely affect "the stability of the state's
economy,""5 and Esenberg spent several pages discussing which supreme
court justices are "pro-liability" and which are "anti-liability.' ' 16 On the
other hand, the critics' broad brush makes it difficult to challenge both
the narrow view of the judicial role that they advocate and to
meaningfully address each decision.
Despite these challenges, a substantive response is worth attempting,
both because the critics' view of the supreme court's role is
objectionable and because the critics have thus far framed public debate
about the court. In 2007, candidates for an open seat on the court set a
record for campaign spending in a state judicial race, due in no small
part to an effort by business interests to overturn or at least limit Ferdon
and Thomas.17 During the race, in debating the court's proper role, the
candidates and others discussed Judge Sykes's and Esenberg's
commentaries."i In 2008, Governor Jim Doyle's only appointee to the
court, Justice Louis Butler, will seek election." Observers expect his
15. Id. at 731.
16. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 11-12.
17. Patrick Marley, Pricey Court Race Might Set New Pace: '08 Campaign Could Surpass
the $6 Million Spent This Time, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at B1.
18. Dee J. Hall, Who's the "Activist" in Court Race, WIS. ST. J. (Madison), Apr. 1, 2007,
at Al (discussing Esenberg's critique of the court and using it to compare the two candidates
for supreme court justice); JAMES A. BUCHEN, THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 2007:
WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR WISCONSIN? 4 (Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce Campaign 2007), available
at http://www.wmc.org/pdffiles/supremecourt_07overview.pdf (stating that Ferdon v.
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund and Thomas v. Mallet will negatively affect
Wisconsin's economy and citing Judge Sykes for the proposition that the supreme court not
only hurt the state's "business climate," but also upset the state government's balance of
power).
19. Marley, supra note 17 (Justice Butler filled the seat vacated by Judge Sykes.).
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race to set a new spending record-in part because he authored Thomas
and supported the other criticized cases. 20 The critics' view will likely
resurface in Justice Butler's campaign.
This article is an attempt to provide a different point of view in the
discussion of the court. It does not engage the critics' charge of
activism, inasmuch as activism is "little more than a rhetorically charged
shorthand for decisions the speaker disagrees with."2  Rather, it
disputes the critics' view of the court's proper role and provides a
different perspective on the five criticized decisions. The article begins
by summarizing the decisions to which the critics object and the
criticisms. It then argues that the role the critics envision for the state
supreme court is unreasonably narrow. Finally, without reaching any
conclusion about the merits of each case, it points to several legal
developments in the decisions that, fairly characterized, are very
positive. It concludes by expressing the hope that the court will not
become inappropriately timid in the face of the recent attacks.
II. THE DECISIONS AND THE CRITICISMS
A. The Criminal Procedure Cases
1. In re Jerrell C.J.
In Jerrell, the court considered a motion to suppress the confession
of a fourteen-year-old armed robbery suspect who confessed only after
police officers interrogated him at length and denied his repeated
requests to call his parents. 2  The court unanimously held that based on
the totality of the circumstances, the lower court should have suppressed
the youth's confession.23 But a majority went further, ruling that in the
future, lower courts may not admit a juvenile's confession in evidence
unless the interrogators record it electronically. 2 The court based the
new rule on its "superintending and administrative authority over all
20. Id.
21. KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, MAKING SENSE OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 3 (2006).
22. In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, TT 5-15, 283 Wis. 2d 145, IT 5-15, 699 N.W.2d 110,
T 5-15.
23. Id. T 36, 283 Wis. 2d 145, T 36, 699 N.W.2d 110, 36.
24. Id. 58, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 58, 699 N.W.2d 110, 58. When an interrogation outside
of a place of detention produces a confession, the confession may be admissible
notwithstanding the lack of a recording if recording was not feasible. Id. T 3, 283 Wis. 2d 145,
3, 699 N.W.2d 110, T 3.
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state courts" conferred by the Wisconsin Constitution.'
The court noted that the supreme courts of two other states had
adopted the same rule and that one court based its decision on its
supervisory authority over the state's judicial system.26 The court also
pointed out that it had previously fashioned rules governing the
admissibility of certain types of unreliable evidence, such as polygraph
evidence and hypnotically-affected testimony. 7 The court found that
recording interrogations of children would reduce disputes over the
voluntariness of confessions and enable judges to more accurately
determine (and in less time) what had occurred during the
interrogations. Further, it found that the new rule would promote
effective law enforcement and protect the constitutional rights of the
accused.29
The partial dissenters argued that the court interpreted its
superintending authority too broadly and declared the decision
illegitimate.' Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson wrote a concurrence in
which she discussed the history of the court's supervisory power and
defended the court's use of such power to create an evidentiary rule."
She argued that it could not be reasonably disputed that the constitution
authorized the court to use its supervisory authority to require that
interrogations be recorded to be admissible and that the dissenters
merely disagreed with the result of the decision on policy grounds.2
Judge Brennan found in Jerrell two of his indicators of activism-a
broad remedy and insufficient deference to the political branches.3
25. Id. 40, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 40, 699 N.W.2d 110, 40; see also WIS. CONST. art. VII, §
3, cl. 1.
26. In re Jerrell, 2005 WI 105, 91 44, 49, 283 Wis. 2d 145, IT 44, 49, 699 N.W.2d 110,
44, 49.
27. Id. 48, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 48, 699 N.W.2d 110, 1 48.
28. Id. I 51-52, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 1 51-52, 699 N.W.2d 110, 1 51-52.
29. Id. IT 50, 53-55,283 Wis. 2d 145, $J 50, 53-55, 699 N.W.2d 110, 50, 53-55.
30. Id. IT 132-33, 283 Wis. 2d 145, I 132-33, 699 N.W.2d 110, [ 132-33 (Prosser, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he court is attempting to dictate the practices
of law enforcement agencies under the guise of 'superintending' state courts."); id. 167, 283
Wis. 2d 145, 167, 699 N.W.2d 110, 1 167 (Roggensack, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[T]he supreme court does not have the authority to regulate how law enforcement,
a part of the executive branch of government, accomplishes its official duties.").
31. Id. $$ 60-95, 283 Wis. 2d 145, IT 60-95, 699 N.W.2d 110, 60-95 (Abrahamson,
C.J., concurring).
32. Id. 65,283 Wis. 2d 145, 1 65,699 N.W.2d 110, 1 65 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
33. Brennan, supra note 3. As to insufficient deference, Judge Brennan suggested that
the court inappropriately usurped the executive branch's authority to regulate law
enforcement. Id.
2007]
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Judge Sykes criticized the court for stepping on the other branches' toes
and faulted its "almost limitless" interpretation of its superintending
authority.34 Esenberg criticized the court for attempting to "tackle" the
false confession issue,35 and cited Sykes for the proposition that the court
should not use its supervisory authority to find solutions to "difficult
social problems" such as the problem of innocent people confessing.36
2. State v. Dubose and State v. Knapp
The court issued Dubose and Knapp on the same day and
announced in them that it would no longer interpret the Wisconsin
Constitution's criminal procedure protections in lock-step with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the parallel protections in the United
States Constitution. In Dubose, relying on the Wisconsin Constitution,
the court announced a new rule governing the admissibility of "showup"
eyewitness identification evidence. 7 The court rejected the United
States Supreme Court's approach as founded on a flawed and outdated
understanding of the reliability of eyewitness identifications and of a
court's ability to gauge such reliability. Under the rule established by
the United States Supreme Court, courts must suppress an eyewitness
identification made under suggestive conditions unless they find that
based on the totality of the circumstances, the identification is
nevertheless reliable. 8 The United States Supreme Court established
that in assessing reliability, courts must consider the following factors:
(1) "the opportunity of the witness to view the [defendant] at the time of
the crime"; (2) "the witness'[s] degree of attention"; (3) "the accuracy of
the witness'[s] prior description of the [defendant]"; (4) "the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation"; and (5)
"the length of time between the crime and the confrontation."
39
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted the vagueness of this multi-
factor test and pointed out that in recent years, social scientists had
34. Sykes, supra note 1, at 736.
35. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 6 (citing In re Jerrell, 2005 WI 105, 57, 283 Wis. 2d 145,
57, 699 N.W.2d 110, 57).
36. Id. at 6-7 (citing Sykes, supra note 1, at 725).
37. State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 7 2, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 2, 699 N.W.2d 582, 1 2. "A
'showup' is an out-of-court pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is presented
singly to a witness for identification purposes." Id. 1 1 n.1, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 1 n.1, 699
N.W.2d 582, T 1 n.1 (quoting State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 263 n.21, 533 N.W.2d 167,
177 n.21 (1995)).
38. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
39. Id.; see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977) (reaffirming Biggers).
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found that eyewitness testimony was often "hopelessly unreliable"4 ° and
that DNA exonerations had shown that "eyewitness misidentification is
now the single greatest source of wrongful convictions in the United
States, and responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other
causes combined."'" The court also noted that research had shown that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish a reliable eyewitness
identification from an unreliable one and that showup identifications are
particularly unreliable. 2 As such, the court announced in Dubose that
"an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be
admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
procedure was necessary.
43
In Knapp, the court examined whether courts should suppress
physical evidence obtained as the result of a non-Mirandized statement
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.4 In Knapp, a police
officer questioned a suspect without providing Miranda warnings
because he feared that if he provided warnings, the suspect might ask
for a lawyer and refuse to answer questions.45 The suspect then led the
officer to physical evidence.46 In 2003, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found such evidence inadmissible as fruit of a poisonous tree,47 but the
United States Supreme Court vacated the ruling in light of United States
v. Patane, in which a plurality of that Court concluded that the United
States Constitution did not require such a result.48 On remand, the state
supreme court found that, notwithstanding the requirements of the
United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution independently
supported its original decision. 9
Prior to Knapp and Dubose, the court ordinarily interpreted
40. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 30, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 30, 699 N.W.2d 582, 30 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995)).
41. Id. $ 30, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 30, 699 N.W.2d 582, $ 30.
42. Id. T$ 31-32, 285 Wis. 2d 143, $ 31-32, 699 N.W.2d 582, $$ 31-32.
43. Id. T 33, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 33, 699 N.W.2d 582, T 33. As to how to conduct a
showup, the court endorsed but did not mandate the recommendations of the Wisconsin
Innocence Project. Id. $ 35,285 Wis. 2d 143, $ 35,699 N.W.2d 582, T 35.
44. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 1, 285 Wis. 2d 86, $ 1, 700 N.W.2d 899, T 1. "Fruit of
the poisonous tree" refers to evidence gathered with the aid of information obtained illegally.
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
45. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, TT 13-14, 285 Wis. 2d 86, $$ 13-14, 700 N.W.2d 899, T$ 13-14.
46. Id. T$ 13-14, 285 Wis. 2d 86, $$ 13-14, 700 N.W.2d 899, $$ 13-14.
47. State v. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, 79, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 79, 666 N.W.2d 881, $ 79.
48. Wisconsin v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S.
630 (2004)).
49. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 2, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 1 2, 700 N.W.2d 899, $ 2.
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Wisconsin's citizen protections consistently with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the parallel clauses of the Federal
Constitution." However, in both Knapp and Dubose, the court noted
that it never disclaimed its authority to do otherwise, that the United
States Supreme Court had repeatedly stated that each state's highest
court could interpret its own constitution independently, and that other
state supreme courts had determined that their state constitutions
provided criminal defendants with increased protections in the same
areas.5 1 In Knapp, the court explained that courts created the
exclusionary rule as a means of implementing a constitutional protection
and that it had done so nearly forty years before the United States
Supreme Court. 2 Further, the court stated that the "'lock-step' theory
of interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution no broader than its federal
counterpart" rested on concerns about uniformity but that
countervailing factors overcame such concerns."
The Jerrell dissenters also dissented in Dubose and Knapp.54 They
criticized the majority for abandoning precedent regarding the
relationship of the state constitution to the United States Constitution1
5
and for relying on social science data in deciding constitutional issues.56
One of the dissenters went so far as to suggest that the United States
Supreme Court was more capable of deciding constitutional issues than
the state supreme court, and therefore the state supreme court should
defer to its judgment. 7 On the other side, one member of the Knapp
majority wrote a concurrence confirming that "the majority opinion
50. Id. 58, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 1 58, 700 N.W.2d 899, 1 58.
51. Id. 58-62, 285 Wis. 2d 86, I 58-62, 700 N.W.2d 899, 58-62; State v. Dubose,
2005 WI 126, 40-42, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 40-42,699 N.W.2d 582, 40-42.
52. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, I[ 22-23, 65, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 22-23, 65, 700 N.W.2d 899, [
22-23, 65.
53. Id. I 59, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 59, 700 N.W.2d 899, 59.
54. Id. I[ 95, 107, 285 Wis. 2d 86, I[ 95, 107, 700 N.W.2d 899, T 95, 107 (Wilcox, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Justice Roggensack); id. 91 108, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 108, 700 N.W.2d 899,
108 (Prosser, J., dissenting); Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 54, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 54, 699 N.W.2d
582, 54 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); id. 68, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 91 68, 699 N.W.2d 582, 1 68
(Prosser, J., dissenting); id. 1 79, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 79, 699 N.W.2d 582, 1 79 (Roggensack, J.,
dissenting).
55. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, I 96-102, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 96-102, 700 N.W.2d 899, 1 96-
102 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 91 58-64, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 91 58-64, 699
N.W.2d 582, 91 58--64 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
56. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 9 65-66, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 9 65-66, 699 N.W.2d 582, T 65-
66 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); id. 89-93, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 89-93, 699 N.W.2d 582, 1 89-93
(Roggensack, J., dissenting).
57. Id. 91 76, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 76, 699 N.W.2d 582, 1 76 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
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serves to reaffirm Wisconsin's position in the 'new federalism'
movement.""
The conservative critics had nothing good to say about Dubose and
Knapp. Judge Brennan said that the decisions displayed his first
indicator of judicial activism-deviation from past precedent. 9 Judge
Sykes echoed this criticism and also accused the Knapp court of
"unvarnished result-orientation" by first basing its conclusion on both
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions and subsequently on the
state constitution. 6° Judge Sykes further suggested that the "new judicial
federalism" movement, which encourages state courts to independently
examine their state constitutions, merely enabled liberal courts to avoid
the rulings of a conservative United States Supreme Court.6' Esenberg
stated that the new judicial federalism "imbues the court with
substantial authority," suggesting that for that reason alone it could not
be trusted. 62
B. The Tort Cases
1. Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund
In Ferdon, the court addressed the issue of whether legislation
capping non-economic damages at $350,000 in medical malpractice cases
violated the Wisconsin Constitution's equal protection clause. 63  The
court considered five possible objectives of the cap: (1) "[e]nsur[ing]
adequate compensation for victims of medical malpractice with
meritorious ... claims"; (2) "[e]nabl[ing] health care insurers to charge
lower malpractice insurance premiums"; (3) protecting the financial
health of the state's Patient Compensation Fund; (4) "[r]educ[ing]
overall health care costs for consumers"; and (5) "[e]ncourag[ing] health
care providers to practice in Wisconsin. ' 6" It then determined that the
58. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 84, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 84, 700 N.W.2d 899, 84 (Crooks, J.,
concurring).
59. Brennan, supra note 3.
60. Sykes, supra note 1, at 733 (chiding Knapp for resting "not on the language or
history of the state constitution's self-incrimination clause but on the court's own policy
judgment flowing from an expansive view of the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary
rule").
61. Id. at 733-34.
62. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 10.
63. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, $ 8, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 8, 701
N.W.2d 440, 8.
64. Id. IT 91-95,284 Wis. 2d 573, 91-95,701 N.W.2d 440, 91-95.
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$350,000 cap did not rationally relate to any of them. As to the first
objective, the court found that the cap failed to provide those claimants
with damages greater than the cap amount (and thus likely younger and
more grievously injured) with adequate compensation. 6 The court also
found that the cap did not advance the other objectives. 66 Thus, the
court concluded that the cap's classification system violated equal
protection principles and did not reach the plaintiff's other arguments.67
The same three dissenters argued that the decision usurped the role of
the legislature and accused the majority of ignoring research showing
that the cap advanced its stated objectives. 68
The critics had strong words for Ferdon. They all agreed that the
decision was insufficiently deferential to the legislative branch.69 Judge
Sykes accused the court of altering the rational basis review standard in
order to get to a desired result and sniped that "[t]he court's
responsibility of judicial review is not a warrant to displace legislative
judgments."7 °  Esenberg lamented that "[a]ggressive scrutiny of
legislative fact finding and a more demanding view of what is and is not
rational limits the notion of judicial deference to legislative policy
choices.""
2. Thomas v. Mallett
In Thomas, the court faced a minor plaintiff with serious disabilities
allegedly caused by white lead carbonate pigment, a kind of lead paint.72
The plaintiff alleged that homes in which he lived contained lead paint
applied sometime between 1900 and the 1970s. However, he could not
identify the brand of paint applied in each home.73 The court examined
65. Id. IT 98-100, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 91 98-100, 701 N.W.2d 440, IT 98-100.
66. Id. 91 184-87,284 Wis. 2d 573, $ 184-87,701 N.W.2d 440, IT 184-87.
67. Id. IT 187-88, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 91 187-88, 701 N.W.2d 440, 187-88. One
concurring justice stated that a higher malpractice cap could pass constitutional scrutiny,
making the precise constitutional basis for the decision somewhat unclear. See id. 91 191-92,
284 Wis. 2d 573, 1 191-92, 701 N.W.2d 440, 91 191-92 (Crooks, J., concurring).
68. Id. 91 204, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 1 204, 701 N.W.2d 440, 1 204 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (in
which Justice Wilcox and Justice Roggensack joined); id. 91 347, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 1 347, 701
N.W.2d 440, 1 347 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (in which Justice Prosser and Justice Wilcox
joined).
69. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 4; Sykes, supra note 1, at 728; Brennan, supra note 3.
70. Sykes, supra note 1, at 728.
71. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 4.
72. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 91 5-11,285 Wis. 2d 236, 9 5-11,701 N.W.2d 523,
I9 5-11.
73. Id. I91 5, 13, 17,285 Wis. 2d 236, IT 5, 13, 17, 701 N.W.2d 523, IT 5, 13, 17.
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whether the plaintiff could sue one or more lead paint manufacturers
under the risk-contribution theory. 4
The court first concluded that lead paint constituted a serious public
health hazard and that lead paint manufacturers had downplayed the
product's risks and continued to market the product long after they
knew of such risks. 5 It then discussed the risk-contribution theory of
liability, first recognized in 1984 in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co."6 In Collins,
the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of exposure to a drug (DES)
while in utero but could not identify the drug's manufacturer.77 The
court found that the plaintiff could recover against any DES
manufacturer under either a negligence or strict liability theory by
showing that such manufacturer contributed to a public risk that caused
her injury." It found this modification of existing common law equitable
because all DES manufacturers created a public health risk and could
pay for injuries more easily than the plaintiff; also, requiring them to do
so would encourage manufacturers to more adequately test drugs before
marketing them.79 Under the risk-contribution theory, each individual
manufacturer could defend by showing that it could not have caused the
plaintiff's injury because it did not produce or market DES either during
the exposure period or in the relevant geographic area.8°
The Thomas defendants first argued against applying the risk-
contribution theory on the ground that the Collins court fashioned the
theory pursuant to the state constitution's remedy clause and not as an
ordinary common law development."' Because the Thomas plaintiff
could sue his landlords, they argued that the remedy clause did not
74. Id. % 149, 285 Wis. 2d 236, % 149, 701 N.W.2d 523, 149.
75. Id. %$ 29-98, 285 Wis. 2d 236, $J 29-98, 701 N.W.2d 523, $$ 29-98.
76. Id. 99, 285 Wis. 2d 236, T 99, 701 N.W.2d 523, 99 (describing Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984)).
77. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 174-75,342 N.W.2d at 41-42.
78. Id. at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50. Specifically, the plaintiff could prove negligence by
showing that: (1) she was exposed to DES; (2) DES caused her subsequent injuries; (3) the
defendant produced or marketed the type of DES exposed to; and (4) "the defendant's
conduct in producing or marketing the DES constituted a breach of a legally recognized duty
to the plaintiff." Id. She could prove strict products liability by showing that: (1) DES was
defective when it left the defendant's possession; (2) DES was unreasonably dangerous; (3)
DES caused the plaintiff's injuries; (4) the defendant actively marketed or produced DES;
and (5) the defendant expected DES to reach consumers without undergoing significant
changes. Id. at 195-96, 342 N.W.2d at 51.
79. Id. at 191-92, 342 N.W.2d at 49-50.
80. Id. at 197-98, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
81. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 1 112,285 Wis. 2d 236, 112, 701 N.W.2d 523, J 112.
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apply." Second, the defendants argued that Collins did not govern
because the risk of lead paint differed from that of DES. 3 Finally, the
defendants argued that the court could not constitutionally apply Collins
to them. ' The court rejected the defendants' first two arguments and
declined to decide their constitutional argument prior to trial.85  Two
justices dissented, arguing that lead poisoning differed from the DES
injury and that the decision expanded tort liability disproportionately to
culpability.6
The critics agreed with the dissenters. Judge Brennan said that
Thomas exhibited his third indicator of activism-a broad holding."
Judge Sykes criticized the decision, stating that it would likely harm
Wisconsin's economy and that the defendants would be unable to
defend against the claims.? She conceded that common law "is all about
judicial policy judgments," but argued that it "develops best when
developed incrementally."'89 Esenberg expressed concern about the
decision's discussion of the state constitution's right to a remedy.'
III. THE COURT'S PROPER ROLE
The conservatives' critiques all argue that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court should play a very narrow role in state affairs, suggesting that it
(and other courts) should avoid taking action whenever a case raises a
significant public policy issue." They advocate a modest and restrained
82. Id. 112, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 112, 701 N.W.2d 523, 112. The Thomas plaintiff could,
and did, sue his landlords for failure to abate the hazard posed by lead paint. Id. IT 15-16,
285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 15-16, 701 N.W.2d 523, IT 15-16.
83. Id. 191 150-60, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 150-60, 701 N.W.2d 523, I 150-60.
84. Id. 91 165,285 Wis. 2d 236, 165,701 N.W.2d 523, 165.
85. Id. 91 150-60, 166, 285 Wis. 2d 236, T 150-60, 166, 701 N.W.2d 523, T 150-60, 166.
86. Id. IT 177-80, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 191 177-80, 701 N.W.2d 523, IT 177-80 (Wilcox, J.,
dissenting); id. 91 277-81, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 91 277-81, 701 N.W.2d 523, IT 277-81 (Prosser,
J., dissenting).
87. Brennan, supra note 3. This criticism is difficult to understand given that Thomas's
holding is quite narrow; it applies only to plaintiffs injured by white lead carbonate pigment.
Presumably, Judge Brennan meant to say that the case could have broad effects or that the
court applied risk-contribution theory to a fact situation to which it was inapplicable.
88. Sykes, supra note 1, at 730-31. Judge Sykes's discussion of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's earlier DES case suggests that she believed the court wrongly decided that case as
well. See id. at 729-30.
89. Id. at 731.
90. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 9.
91. See, e.g., id. at 1 (stating that courts should "apply rules," "as opposed to making
them"); id. at 2 (stating that if judges decide "which set of policies are best" then they cease to
act as judges); Sykes, supra note 1, at 727-31 (stating that the court should not solve "policy
problems"); Brennan, supra note 3 (stating that judges should act as "non-partisan legal
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court that defers to the other branches of government. 9 Certainly, in
many situations the court should behave with restraint and deference.
However, the commentaries take little note of the fact that the state
constitution confers on the court a broader role than the one they
advocate, and they never grapple with the difficult issue of when
restraint and deference must yield to other concerns. As such, they
refuse to entertain the possibility that in certain situations, the court best
serves justice by exercising its constitutional power boldly and
innovatively.93
This section discusses the court's constitutional power and then
takes issue with the views underlying the critics' discussion of the five
decisions-that a court must always defer, should always follow
precedent, and should not establish remedies applicable to future cases.
A. The Court's Constitutional Power
The Wisconsin Constitution vests the state's judicial power in a
unified court system with the supreme court as its head.94 The
constitution does not limit the supreme court's power, although the
court itself limits judicial authority to the resolution of actual
controversies,95 subject to limited exceptions.6
The critiques imply that the court should avoid resolving policy
issues as a matter of constitutional principle. However, in resolving
controversies, Wisconsin courts, particularly the supreme court, the
technicians," that should "find specific answers to legal questions in the text, structure and
history of the law, or ... not rule at all").
92. See, e.g., ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 1-2 (defining "judicial restraint"); Sykes, supra
note 1, at 737 (lamenting that the words "modesty" and "restraint" are "missing from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's current vocabulary"); Brennan, supra note 3 (stating that an
activist court shows "insufficient deference to political decision-makers" and that courts
should act as "legal technicians").
93. To slightly rephrase Barry Goldwater's famous call to arms, modesty in the pursuit
of justice is not always a virtue. See Bart Barnes, Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies, WASH.
POST, May 30, 1998, at Al (citing Goldwater's famous line: "extremism in the defense of
liberty is no vice and ... moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue").
94. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
95. Hogan v. City of La Crosse, 104 Wis. 106, 107, 80 N.W. 105, 105 (1899).
96. The court may "decide an otherwise moot issue if it is of great public importance or
arises frequently enough to warrant a definitive decision to guide the circuit courts." State ex
rel. Riesch v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, 12, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 9 12, 692 N.W.2d 219, $ 12; Carlyle v.
Karns, 9 Wis. 2d 394, 397, 101 N.W.2d 92, 93 (1960). The court invokes this exception, for
example, when a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute. State ex rel. La Crosse
Tribune v. Cir. Ct., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 340 N.W.2d 460, 464 (1983); Doering v. Swoboda,
214 Wis. 481, 488, 253 N.W. 657, 659 (1934).
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state's "preeminent law-developing court," ' regularly define and make
law. Courts make law, often very important law, when they fashion
common law rules.9' Further, when courts promulgate exclusionary
rules in the area of constitutional criminal procedure, they both examine
the policy choices of the state's constitution and make new rules
consistent with such choices.9 Finally, even when they interpret statutes
or apply statutes or settled common law to novel facts, courts must
weigh the policy implications of any reasonable interpretation.'0°
Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court heads the state's justice
system, it possesses special powers related to ensuring that the courts
operate effectively. The state constitution vests the supreme court with
superintending and administrative authority over lower state courts, and
the court interprets this power broadly. °' Within a few years of the
state's formation, the court stated that its superintending authority
is a grant of power. It is unlimited in extent. It is
undefined in character. It is unsupplied with means and
instrumentalities. The constitution leaves us wholly in
the dark as to the means of exercising this clear,
unequivocal grant of power. It gives, indeed, the
jurisdiction, but does not pretend to intimate its
instruments or agencies.' °
Further, in the court's view, its exercise of this power "'is shaped, not by
97. Hilton v. Dep't of Natural Res., 2006 WI 84, 54, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 54, 717 N.W.2d
166, 54.
98. See, e.g., Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, % 9-17, 272 Wis. 2d 46,
T 9-17, 680 N.W.2d 345, %% 9-17 (discussing the relationship between public policy and
proximate cause in Wisconsin tort law). The Wisconsin courts' robust common law-making
function is, of course, in contrast to the federal judiciary, which has a very limited common
law function.
99. See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 91 43, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 1 43, 629 N.W.2d 625, 43.
The critics mistakenly suggest that courts lift exclusionary rules directly from the language of
a constitution. See Sykes, supra note 1, at 733; ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 9. On the
contrary, Wisconsin's exclusionary rule is a judge-made remedy designed to safeguard
constitutional rights through deterrence. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 91 43, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 43, 629
N.W.2d 625, J1 43 (citing Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 636, 218 N.W.2d 252, 262 (1974)).
100. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court (In re Criminal Complaint), 2004 WI 58, 11
43-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 43-52, 681 N.W.2d 110, 9 43-52 (discussing statutory
interpretation).
101. Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521,548, 576 N.W.2d 245, 256 (1998).
102. Attorney Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277, 283 (1853), quoted in In re Jerrell C.J., 2005
WI 105, 91 75 n.18, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 1 75 n.18, 699 N.W.2d 110, 9 75 n.18 (Abrahamson, C.J.,
concurring).
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prior usage, but by the continuing necessity that this court carry out its
function as a supreme court"' and is a matter of policy, rather than
permission."3 In addition to its superintending powers, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court possesses inherent powers, i.e., powers necessary to
fulfill its "'constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions."" ° Thus,
the Wisconsin Constitution created a powerful judiciary with a strong
supreme court and contains no language justifying the critics' avowed
preference for the "political branches."' 5
However, the constitution also imposes checks on the judiciary."l
Wisconsin's judicial branch depends on the legislature for funding,
space, and the definition of its appellate jurisdiction. 7 It depends on
the executive branch to enforce its judgments." Perhaps most
importantly, Wisconsin citizens may also check the power of the
judiciary. The Wisconsin constitution provides for an entirely elected
judiciary," and it is relatively easy to amend Wisconsin's constitution.'
Thus, the notion that courts are anti-democratic, which is implicit in the
critics' distrust of the judiciary, is misplaced.
103. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 519, 235 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1975), quoted in In re
Jerrell, 2005 WI 105, $ 88, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 88, 699 N.W.2d 110, $ 88 (Abrahamson, C.J.,
concurring).
104. Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 548, 576 N.W.2d at 256 (quoting State ex rel. Friedrich v.
Circuit Court, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32, 37 (1995)). The court has invoked its
inherent power to create the Code of Judicial Ethics, determine whether attorney fees were
reasonable, clarify judges' power to remove their judicial assistants, and procure adequate
space for trials. Id. at 550-51, 576 N.W.2d at 257.
105. The critics appear to use the term "political branches" to imply that the judiciary is
elitist and unaccountable. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing
this concern regarding an appointed judiciary); JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO
PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM 52-53 (1999). See generally
MARK KOZLOWSKI, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG
ABOUT THE COURTS (2003).
106. See RANNEY, supra note 105, at 49-69 (discussing the drafting of the Wisconsin
Constitution).
107. See Wis. CONST. arts. V & VII; Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 129,
142 n.5, 260 N.W.2d 36, 42 n.5 (1977).
108. See WiS. CONST. art. VII; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 105 (stating
that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch, as it has "neither force nor will, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments") (emphasis omitted).
109. WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5 & 7. Indeed, over the years, some have raised
concerns that Wisconsin's elective system causes judges to be too concerned with the public
will. See RANNEY, supra note 105, at 52-53 (discussing concerns about the elective system at
the drafting); Jason J. Czarnezki, Voting and Electoral Politics in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 323-24 (2003) (discussing contemporary concerns).
110. Compare WIS. CONST. art. XII with U.S. CONST. art. V.
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B. Deference to Political Branches
The critiques advocate an almost limitless deference by Wisconsin's
courts to the other branches regarding any major, politically charged
issue. They argue that the courts should allow the other branches to
exercise their discretion without interference. In certain situations,
courts should of course defer to the legislature. However, the state
judiciary is a coequal branch of government, and no generally applicable
rule requires that it be deferential."'
In many cases, references to judicial deference or judicial modesty
simply make no sense. For instance, in developing the common law,
courts look at the other branches only to ensure that the legislature has
not already spoken on an issue; they then seek to create workable public
policy."' Further, in stating what the state constitution requires,
Wisconsin's courts do not seek guidance from the other branches."3
Rather, they use well-established rules of constitutional interpretation
to determine a particular provision's application to a new set of facts. In
constitutional cases involving exclusionary rules, the critics advocate
deference to the executive branch." ' In determining whether a new rule
is appropriate or how to interpret an existing rule, the state supreme
court defers to the executive in the sense that it balances the need to
prevent official misconduct with the practicalities of law enforcement." '5
However, where the former outweighs the latter, the court may
appropriately decide what is ultimately an evidentiary and constitutional
issue in favor of the criminal defendant. 6
When the legislature expresses a constitutional policy choice,
though, courts indeed must defer to the legislature."7 For this reason,
111. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 598 (1855); see also Clinton
v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997).
112. See Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 62, 9-17, 272 Wis. 2d 46,
9-17, 680 N.W.2d 345, 9-17; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, T 43, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 43, 629
N.W.2d 625, 43.
113. State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436-37, 424 N.W.2d 385,387
(1988).
114. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 6; Sykes, supra note 1, at 736; Brennan, supra note 3.
115. See Eason, 2001 WI 98, T 43, 245 Wis. 2d 206, $ 43,629 N.W.2d 625, 91 43.
116. See id.
117. Harry Crow & Son, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 18 Wis. 2d 436, 442 n.7, 118 N.W.2d 841,
844 n.7 (1963). A court also sometimes properly defers to an executive branch decision, such
as the decision of an administrative agency. Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of
Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, 1 14, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 1 14, 717 N.W.2d 184, 14. Such
deference arises out of the court's obligation to defer to the legislature's policy choices. Id. $
18, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 9 18, 717 N.W.2d 184, 18 (citing UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review
[91:425
2007] EXERCISING JUDICIAL POWER
when a court interprets a statute, it attempts to ascertain the
legislature's intent." Further, while the legislature may overrule
common law by enacting a statute, a court cannot choose common law
over a statute."9 However, there is a significant limit to the legislature's
discretion. A court need only defer to constitutional policy choices, and
the judicial branch ultimately determines whether legislative choices,
even politically charged ones, are constitutional.2 In doing so, the
judiciary does not defer to the legislature's judgment as to the
constitutionality of its own acts.' Indeed, an overly deferential court
could undermine the central premise of judicial review-that the
government is not above the law.'22
To some extent, the critiques' use of the term judicial deference does
not refer to deference generally, but rather refers to the critics'
contention that the supreme court misstated and erroneously applied
substantive constitutional law in Ferdon.123  Under clearly established
precedent, a court examining whether an ordinary statute violates the
equal protection clause questions only whether such statute is rationally
related to legitimate state interests.'24 The critics are correct that this test
is deferential to the legislature. However, defining the contours and
application of the rational basis test is among the more difficult and
Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286-87, 548 N.W.2d 57, 63 (1996)).
118. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court (In re Criminal Complaint), 2004 WI 58, 1
43-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 1$ 43-52, 681 N.W.2d 110, 43-52. In interpreting a statute, the
court often considers policy, but it considers policy as expressed by the state constitution and
the legislature, rather than in a broader sense.
119. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d at 442 n.7, 118 N.W.2d at 844 n.7.
120. State ex reL Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d at 436-37, 424 N.W.2d at 387
(stating that the court has a responsibility to decide constitutional questions,
"notwithstanding the fact that the case involves political considerations or that final judgment
may have practical political consequences"). In reviewing a statute, the court generally states
that it presumes that a statute is constitutional. See, e.g., State v. Laxton (In re Laxton), 2002
WI 82, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784. This language is somewhat imprecise, as it could be
read to indicate that the judiciary defers to the legislature's judgment as to the
constitutionality of its own acts. See Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 564 n.13, 480 N.W.2d
460, 485 n.13 (1992) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (referring to the confusing nature of
referring to a "presumption" of constitutionality). However, this "presumption" indicates
only that a court will not declare the statute unconstitutional unless it is confident that it is
unconstitutional. However, if a litigant persuades the court that a statute is unconstitutional,
the court owes the legislature no deference and must strike down the act. Attorney Gen. ex
rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 (1855); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
121. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d at 437, 424 N.W.2d at 387.
122. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 105.
123. ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 3-4; Sykes, supra note 1, at 728; Brennan, supra note 3.
124. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, 73, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 73, 701
N.W.2d 440, 1 73.
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contentious areas in constitutional law, and courts have failed to resolve
contradictory decisions on the issue.25 The critics attempted to resolve
this difficult issue simply by ignoring the precedent cited in Ferdon,
citing contradictory cases, and declaring that Ferdon was wrong. This
article will not debate their cursory discussion of complex law.
However, even under a very deferential version of the rational basis
test, the court retains the power of judicial review and there is a
meaningful limit on the legislature's discretion.
C. Adherence to Precedent
The critiques accuse the court of betraying the doctrine of stare
decisis, which directs courts to generally follow precedent. As applied
by a lower court to a higher court's decision, the doctrine of stare decisis
is rigid.126 However, as the critics well know, as applied to a court's own
decisions, stare decisis is fairly flexible because a court may always
correct itself.127 Thus, criticism of a court for failing to follow precedent
generally says only that the critic dislikes the decision that modified or
overturned the precedent.
As the state's highest court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court may, as
Judge Sykes put it, "throw off . . . constraints, revise the rules of
decision, and set the law on a new course. 128 And the court does so if it
concludes that: (1) changes or developments in the law have
undermined a decision's rationale; (2) newly ascertained facts require a
new rule; (3) coherence and consistency require a new rule; (4) the prior
decision is legally unsound; and (5) the prior decision is practically
unworkable. 2' The court also considers "whether [the precedent] has
produced a settled body of law."130 Practically, the stare decisis doctrine
means that when it wants to, the Wisconsin Supreme Court can state
that it "is bound by its own precedent" and leave it at that."'
125. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, "There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause": An
Appreciation of Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301
(2006); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350,
359 (2002); Michael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis
Scrutiny, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329 (2003).
126. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.06 (3d ed.
2007).
127. See id.
128. Sykes, supra note 1, at 725-26.
129. Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, J 33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 91 33,
717 N.W.2d 216, 33. Compare id. with MOORE ET AL., supra note 126, § 134.06.
130. Bartholomew, 2006 WI 91, 34, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 1 34, 717 N.W.2d 216, 91 34.
131. See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, 91 41, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 91
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Alternatively, when the court concludes that it should change existing
law, it will note that stare decisis is "not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision" and then proceed to embark on what it
views as a wiser course.132
The doctrine's flexibility has led some to speculate that it has "the
predictability of a lightning bolt: it will strike on occasion, but when and
where can only be known after the fact., 13 3  However, normative
judgments on the lack of predictability are difficult because the decision
whether to apply stare decisis involves competing policies, all of which
are fundamental to the rule of law-stability, legitimacy, accuracy,
practicality. Frank Easterbrook, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, puts it this way: the "possibility of improvement
makes precedent unstable. It ought to be unstable, provided we can
focus judges' attention and bring to the case sufficient care to be sure
that our information exceeds that of the judges who acted earlier. 114
D. Broad Rules and Remedies
Looking particularly but not exclusively to Jerrell, the critiques argue
that the court inappropriately set remedies aimed at future conduct
rather than setting remedies case by case.1 35 Because the legislature is
the primary policy maker, courts generally remedy only the dispute
before them and leave the prevention of future disputes to the
legislative branch. However, constitutional criminal procedure is a
unique area of law that sometimes requires courts of last resort to play a
more active role in preventing future disputes.
Constitutional criminal procedure is unique for several reasons.
First, in the context of criminal prosecutions, the federal and state
constitutions express a particular concern about restraining the
discretion of the executive branch.136 This concern reflects the fact that
41, 697 N.W.2d 417, 41. For this line's federal counterpart, see Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct.
2479, 2489 (2006) (stating that the "principle has become settled").
132. Bartholomew, 2006 WI 91, 31, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 31, 717 N.W.2d 216, T 31. For
this line's federal counterpart, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
133. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 390 (1981).
134. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 422,423 (1988).
135. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 3 ("An activist court would not only declare certain
acts unconstitutional but also would mandate that future actions by the parties acknowledge
court-ordered requirements."); ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 7 (endorsing "case-by-case
adjudication").
136. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI; WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8.
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executive branch officials have sometimes abused their powers in this
area and that abuse is always a potential problem. Second, criminal
cases and the constitutional questions that they often raise clog state
courts.13 Third, legislatures have historically failed to regulate the
conduct of law enforcement and thereby prevent constitutionally
questionable conduct from entering the court system.'38 Thus, when
they observe a string of abuses, courts of last resort act appropriately
when they create rules designed to keep evidence procured by such
abuses out of state courtrooms. In doing so, they guide law enforcement
as to how to stay within the law, ease the burden on the lower courts,
and encourage the other branches to take action to prevent further
abuses.13 9
A state's highest court is even more justified in making rules in the
area of constitutional criminal procedure than the United States
Supreme Court. A state supreme court need not concern itself with
problems of federalism. In addition, the constitutions of most states,
including Wisconsin, confer rule-making power on the states' highest
courts, thus authorizing them to regulate the admissibility of evidence."4
At least one commentator has argued that state high courts should use
their rule-making powers to entirely overhaul the United States
Supreme Court's complex and confusing balancing approach to many
admissibility questions that arise in the area of constitutional criminal
procedure in order to provide more meaningful guidance to police and
137. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1149 n.28 (1985) (referring to the volume of
Wisconsin's criminal cases and the percentage of those cases involving constitutional
questions).
138. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson,
Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 46
(2001).
139. Id. at 39-46. Professor Dripps refers to Miranda v. Arizona as the quintessential
example of proper constitutional rule making. Id. at 9-21 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)). Prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court determined whether a criminal defendant's
confession was voluntary case by case, leading to significant confusion among executive
officials, lower courts, and commentators. Id. at 10-11. As such, most abuses went
unchecked and law enforcement officials lacked an incentive to curb abusive behavior. Id. at
11. In Miranda, the Court insisted that officials inform a suspect of his rights prior to a
custodial interview and thereby clarified this area and effectuated the due process clause. Id.
at 13-21.
140. Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial
Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283,
308-09 (2003). Compare WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3 with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 438 (2000) (stating that the Supreme Court lacks supervisory authority over state courts,
and thus it may only announce rules dictated by the Constitution itself).
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lower courts. 141
IV. POSITIVE LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
The critics are correct on at least one count-the five decisions
discussed here are worthy of notice. The court took bold steps in new
directions and announced that it is unwilling to blindly stand by
precedent or follow the lead of other jurisdictions if it concludes that the
precedent is irrelevant or unworkable or that the other jurisdictions are
incorrect. This section moves beyond the criticism of the court and
discusses some of the positive legal developments found in the cases. As
previously indicated, this article takes no position with respect to the
holdings of each of the five decisions. However, this section asserts that
several of the currents running through some or all of the decisions-if
applied consistently and appropriately-promise to positively impact
the development of Wisconsin law.
A. Protecting the Integrity and Efficacy of the Courts
As stated above, each criticized decision differs from the others.
However, the decisions share a common trait-the question presented
by each case, in different ways, implicated the integrity of the judiciary,
the functioning of the court system, or both. And in each case, the court
carefully considered the possible effects of the case and took action
aimed at strengthening and improving the state's judiciary.
The criminal procedure cases implicated both the integrity of the
court and administrative concerns relevant to the functioning of the
courts. In Jerrell, Knapp, and Dubose, the court established rules to
keep evidence obtained through objectionable practices out of the
courtroom. As the branch of government that presides over criminal
trials, the judiciary is particularly competent to make such rules, and in
doing so, it protects the integrity of the courts and the criminal justice
system. In Jerrell and Dubose, the court further attempted to protect
the integrity of the judiciary by taking steps toward preventing wrongful
convictions. Wrongful convictions represent a unique and increasingly
visible threat to public perception of the judiciary. Esenberg sneered at
Jerrell's statement that "it is time for Wisconsin to tackle the false
confession issue."'' 2 He utterly failed to recognize that Wisconsin's
141. Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065, 1092-96 (1997).
142. See ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 6 (referencing In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, T 52,
283 Wis. 2d 145, T 52, 699 N.W.2d 110, 52)).
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judicial system is the instrument of injustice for the state's wrongfully
convicted. As such, it is both responsible for preventing wrongful
convictions and arguably more capable of doing so than the other
branches. Contrary to the critics, the problem of wrongful convictions is
not simply a "difficult social problem" that the state supreme court is
powerless to alleviate. 1'3 Rather, it is a problem that in part stems from
the courts themselves and demands court action.
As to administrative issues, in Jerrell and Dubose the court
attempted to simplify the complicated and unwieldy process by which
courts determine the admissibility of evidence in certain criminal cases.
In doing so, the court sought to enable lower courts to more efficiently
and accurately adjudicate difficult constitutional questions.
The facts underlying the supreme court's tort decisions also
implicated the functioning of the judicial system. In Ferdon, a jury
determined that a serious injury resulted from negligence and that the
plaintiff was entitled to damages exceeding the statutory cap.'" Thus,
the court faced more than an equal protection question; the case also
implicated the judicial system's capacity to provide an adequate remedy
and the right to a jury trial.' 5 In Thomas, the court examined a case in
which each of the defendants manufactured a product that (the court
assumed, for summary judgment purposes) injured a wholly innocent
plaintiff.' 6  The facts raised the possibility that the innocent plaintiff
would be left with no compensation from the industry that actually
harmed him. Thus, in Ferdon and Thomas, the court ensured that the
doors of the courthouse remained open.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court must sometimes act with deference
143. See id. at 7 (quoting Sykes, supra note 1, at 725).
144. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, $ 2-3, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 2-3,
701 N.W.2d 440, 2-3.
145. The court never reached the constitutional questions of whether the statute
implicated these rights. However, it suggested that practical concerns about remedies and the
right to a jury trial played some role in its assessment of the rationality of the statute. See id.
1 101, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 101, 701 N.W.2d 440, 101 ("[W]hen the legislature shifts the
economic burden of medical malpractice from insurance companies and negligent health care
providers to a small group of vulnerable, injured patients, the legislative action does not
appear rational."). For an interesting discussion of the role of courts in reviewing medical
malpractice cases, see Howard Alan Learner, Note, Restrictive Medical Malpractice
Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual
Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 187-88 (1981).
146. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 133, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 133, 701 N.W.2d 523,
133. Of course, Steven Thomas had not yet shown that white lead carbonate pigment
manufactured by one or more of the defendants caused his condition. Id. 1$ 17-20, 285 Wis.
2d 236, 17-20, 701 N.W.2d 523, % 17-20.
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and restraint; however, when a case may affect the judiciary's capacity
to fulfill its constitutional role, it may act more boldly. In the cited
cases, the court conducted a searching analysis of the facts and law
underpinning the cases and considered innovative remedies. To the
extent that this represents a legal development in which the court
engages in a deeper analysis when the judiciary's integrity and efficacy
are on the line, it is a positive one.
B. Using Available Knowledge to Address Wrongful Convictions
In Jerrell and Dubose, the court examined court rules and
constitutional standards in light of up-to-date research on wrongful
convictions and sought to craft new rules that would prevent future
miscarriages of justice. '47
The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the defendant's
innocence or guilt.' 48  Constitutional rules regarding eyewitness
identification and involuntary confessions serve this purpose; they
prevent the admission of unreliable evidence and evidence procured
through government misconduct. 49  However, recent post-conviction
DNA exonerations show that these rules are not keeping out unreliable
evidence-as of 1999, false confessions and erroneous eyewitness
identifications together accounted for eighty-four percent of
documented wrongful convictions."" Moreover, as to eyewitness
147. In these respects, the court placed itself squarely within two of Wisconsin's salutary
legal traditions-the University of Wisconsin's signature "law in action" approach to
teaching, which rejects a wholly theoretical view of the law and asks how law actually affects
individuals and institutions on the ground, and the "Wisconsin Idea," which refers to the state
government's reliance on research coming out of the state university in addressing difficult
problems. See Stewart Macaulay, Wisconsin's Legal Tradition, 24 GARGOYLE, at 6, 6-10
(1994), available at http://law.wisc.edu/facstaff/macaulay/papers/wisconsin-legal-tradition.pdf;
Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment,
2006 WiS. L. REV. 645, 699 (noting the University of Wisconsin Law School's commitment
"to supporting research about the way law interacts with real-world institutions," which
allows for "meaningful partnerships between academics and policymakers to flourish in the
state"); The Wisconsin Idea, http://www.wisc.edu/wisconsinldea/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
148. State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, $ 155, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 1 155, 695 N.W.2d 783, T 155.
149. Due process concerns about eyewitness identifications are clearly all about
reliability. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). The test regarding
involuntary confessions is more closely related to the specificity of the right against self-
incrimination and the prevention of police misconduct. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
384 n.11 (1964). However, there is no question that involuntary confessions in fact implicate
reliability. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 92 (2000) (referring to the
proof of false confessions).
150. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 149, at 73.
2007]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
identifications, social science research indicates why-the test utilized
by the United States Supreme Court includes reliability indicators that
are irrelevant to reliability.' As to confessions, research does not
establish that the test for determining admissibility is flawed, but the test
is quite difficult to apply.
In Dubose and Jerrell, the Wisconsin Supreme Court wisely rejected
the dissenting justices' argument that a court has no business examining
this reality. According to the dissenters, and to the critics, only the text
of the constitution can resolve constitutional questions.12 Thus, they
viewed the court's consideration of information emerging from
exonerations and from the academy as irresponsible. However, the
federal constitutional rules that the court examined are not based on the
plain text of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Due Process Clause as requiring plainly unreliable evidence to be
excluded from criminal trials.' The rules rest on practical questions left
unanswered by this interpretation: What evidence is unreliable? And
how can courts best ensure that unreliable evidence is kept out of the
courtroom? The text of the Due Process Clause is of absolutely no
value in answering these questions. In contrast, DNA exonerations and
relevant social science data have tremendous value in this area.
Thus, courts have a choice. They may stubbornly refuse to examine
this evidence out of fear that the social science data may one day change
again. Or they may modify the present, demonstrably ineffectual rules.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court took the sensible course-it examined
the relevant data and it changed direction. Only time will tell if its new
tests are an improvement. However, if the court had, as the dissenters
and critics wished, simply turned a blind eye to the lessons of the DNA
exonerations, it would have effectively shirked its responsibility to
oversee the administration of justice in the state.
C. Reviving State Constitutional Law
The court's move in Knapp and Dubose away from interpreting the
individual rights provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution in lock-step
151. Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a
New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41
VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 120-22 (2006).
152. State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 1 65-66, 285 Wis. 2d 143, $ 65-66, 699 N.W.2d
582, 1$ 65-66 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); id. 191 89-93, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 1 89-93, 699 N.W.2d
582, 1 89-93 (Roggensack, J., dissenting); ESENBERG, supra note 4, at 1; Sykes, supra note
1, at 734-35.
153. See, e.g., Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
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with the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the United
States Constitution's parallel provisions is also a positive development
and contains much promise for improving the law in Wisconsin.
It has always been clear that the Wisconsin Supreme Court could
interpret the Wisconsin Constitution independent of the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution. In the
early part of the twentieth century, it actively did so.' 5 But, as in most
states, the Warren Court's incorporation of much of the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment, making its protections enforceable
against the states, more or less stopped the development of Wisconsin
constitutional law in its tracks. '55 In the past thirty years, the court has
occasionally signaled a change, such as when it stated that it never
abdicated its authority to independently interpret the state constitution
and it would "not be bound by the minimums which are imposed by the
Supreme Court of the United States if it is the judgment of this court
that the Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require that
greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be afforded. ' 56  In
general, though, prior to Knapp and Dubose, the court vacillated on the
issue. Different cases expressed very different sentiments regarding the
relationship of the state constitution to its federal counterpart, with the
difference presumably attributable to the prevailing majority in each
157
case.
154. See, e.g., Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923) (recognizing the
exclusionary rule long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); Carpenter v. County of
Dane, 9 Wis. 249, 253 (1859) (finding, more than one hundred years prior to Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that the State must provide all indigent criminal defendants
with counsel); see also Abrahamson, supra note 137, at 1144-46 (discussing the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's early constitutional jurisprudence).
155. Abrahamson, supra note 137, at 1147-48; Junaid H. Chida, Comment,
Rediscovering the Wisconsin Constitution: Presentation of Constitutional Questions in State
Courts, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 483, 493.
156. State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210, 216 (1977).
157. Compare State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 42, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 1 42, 647 N.W.2d
142, J 42 (written by then-Justice Sykes) (stating that absent a "meaningful difference
between the state and federal" constitutions, the court would follow its federal counterpart),
and State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 260, 421 N.W.2d 77, 90 (1988) ("[T]here can be no
logical argument that the state constitutional provision creates a broader right since the
language of the Wisconsin Constitution is certainly no stronger than that used in the United
States Constitution"), with State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 59, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 59, 604 N.W.2d
517, T 59 ("Although we generally conform art. 1, § 11 to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
it would be a sad irony for this court to exhort magistrates to act as something more than
'rubber stamps' when issuing warrants, and to then act as mere rubber stamps ourselves when
interpreting our Wisconsin Constitution. It is our responsibility to examine the [s]tate
[c]onstitution independently."), and Doe, 78 Wis. 2d at 172, 254 N.W.2d at 216.
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Knapp and Dubose definitively announced the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's commitment to independent interpretation of the state
constitution. This is a positive development for several reasons. First,
the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary rules arise out of the
Constitution, but they do not rest on its plain "text," as discussed
above. Thus, the similarity between the text of the federal and state
constitutions should not end the discussion. 9 Further, the United States
Supreme Court is not infallible, and its decisions should not be treated
as such. In fact, with regard to criminal procedure, state supreme courts
see far more criminal cases than the United States Supreme Court and
thus are arguably better able to recognize recurring constitutional
violations and create workable solutions.16
In addition, the theoretical justification for pegging the development
of the state constitution to that of the United States Constitution-
uniformity-is weak and growing weaker. The nation's federalist
system contemplates variation among the several states in virtually
every area of law. There has never been a good reason to think that the
benefits of uniformity concerning the legality of police conduct is
stronger than the benefits of uniformity concerning the legality of any
other conduct. 61  The uniformity rationale is growing weaker because
many state courts have found that their state constitutions provide
greater citizen protections than the Federal Constitution, and thus there
is no uniformity.
16 1
In contrast, the theoretical justification for independent
interpretation is strong. As Knapp's concurring justice noted, "When a
state court interprets the constitution of its state merely as a restatement
of the Federal Constitution, it both insults the dignity of the state
Prior to Knapp and Dubose, the Wisconsin Supreme court actually found a greater right
in the Wisconsin Constitution only once. State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 63, 245 Wis. 2d 206,
63, 629 N.W.2d 625, $ 63 (regarding the "good faith exception" to the warrant requirement).
158. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
159. But see Sykes, supra note 1, at 737.
160. See Abrahamson, supra note 137, at 1149 n.28.
161. In fact, the benefits of uniformity would be much greater for, say, substantive
criminal statutes. One state's prosecution of conduct that is legal in another, or one state's
use of a penalty (such as the death penalty) barred in another, speaks to basic concerns about
human liberty and fairness. And law enforcement officials generally work in a single state
and have ample opportunity to learn any applicable differences in constitutional law.
162. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 87, 285 Wis. 2d 86, T 87, 700 N.W.2d 899, 87
(Crooks, J., concurring) (quoting Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 12 n.21 (Tex. 1992))
(stating that between 1970 and 1989, about 600 published opinions found that a state
constitution provided protections beyond that of the Federal Constitution).
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charter and denies citizens the fullest protection of their rights.' 163
Independent interpretation promotes the founders' federalist ideals and
treats a state as a state.
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed by the critics and in this article are notable,
but it is still too early to know exactly where they will lead. The court
has continued to challenge the state's medical malpractice legislation
caps, finding in 2006 that the caps on damages in wrongful death suits,
like those relating to injuries, are unconstitutional.' The court has also
continued to use its supervisory authority to establish tests designed to
ease the lower courts' burden in determining the rights of litigants.1
61
However, the court has noticeably backed away from Knapp and
Dubose. In three recent cases, the court simply suggested that its
interpretation of the state constitution is tied to the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution and
then applied federal law without further discussion.6 6 This is contrary to
the federalist notion that a state court should independently interpret
the state constitution in every case-even when it ultimately finds that a
state protection is coexistent with, or weaker than, a federal
163. Id. 87, 285 Wis. 2d 86, T1 87, 700 N.W.2d 899, 91 87 (Crooks, J., concurring)
(quoting Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 12).
164. See generally Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d
38, 717 N.W.2d 216.
165. See State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 91 1-2, 283 Wis. 2d 300, TT 1-2,699 N.W.2d 92, TT
1-2 (Wilcox, J., concurring). In Ernst, the court used its supervisory authority to affirm an
earlier decision mandating that lower courts engage in a colloquy with criminal defendants
waiving their right to counsel. Id. It had to draw either from this authority or from the state
constitution to affirm the earlier decision, given that the United States Supreme Court had
recently clarified that the Federal Constitution did not require such a colloquy. Id. T 10-21,
283 Wis. 2d 300, TT9 10-21, 699 N.W.2d 92, TT 10-21. Two of the three justices who disagreed
with the Jerrell majority's use of the court's supervisory authority assented to its use in Ernst.
Compare In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, TT 160, 177, 283 Wis. 2d 145, TT 160, 177, 699
N.W.2d 110, 9T 160, 177 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (in which Justice Wilcox joined), with
Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 1, 283 Wis. 2d 300, T 1, 699 N.W.2d 92, 91 1 (in which Justice
Roggensack joined); id. T1 50, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 9 50, 699 N.W.2d 92, T 50 (Wilcox, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (in which Justice Wilcox concurred with the
majority's decision to use its supervising authority).
166. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 9 10 n.2, 301 Wis. 2d 1, T 10 n.2, 733 N.W.2d 634, 91 10
n.2; State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 91 20 n.1, 299 Wis. 2d 177, T 20 n.1, 727 N.W.2d 503, 91 20 n.1;
State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, 9 30, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 91 30, 717 N.W.2d 729, T 30. A recent
concurring opinion also ignored Knapp and Dubose. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 91 52, 283 Wis. 2d
300, T1 52, 699 N.W.2d 92, T 52 (Wilcox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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protection.67 As such, it is presently unclear whether Knapp and
Dubose are aberrations or whether the later cases are mere hiccups in
the court's development of an independent constitutional jurisprudence.
It seems certain, however, that the decisions addressed by the critics
and in this article will continue to play a central part in discussion of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and the role that it should play in public life.
Until now, the legal commentaries regarding these decisions have
offered an unreasonably narrow and constrained view of the court's
role. Hopefully, the court will continue to hold a more reasoned view of
its role and will not be discouraged from continuing to explore bold
solutions to vexing problems facing the judiciary and the state.
167. See, e.g., Freisen, supra note 141, at 1069; Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the
Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State
Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1023 (1997). As an
Oregon Supreme Court justice aptly put it: "The right question is not whether a state's
guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The right question is what the state's guarantee means and how it applies to
the case at hand." Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18
GA. L. REV. 165, 179 (1984).
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